Security Techniques for Device Assisted Services

ABSTRACT

Security techniques for device assisted services are provided. In some embodiments, secure service measurement and/or control execution partition is provided. In some embodiments, implementing a service profile executed at least in part in a secure execution environment of a processor of a communications device for assisting control of the communications device use of a service on a wireless network, in which the service profile includes a plurality of service policy settings, and wherein the service profile is associated with a service plan that provides for access to the service on the wireless network; monitoring use of the service based on the service profile; and verifying the use of the service based on the monitored use of the service.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

With the advent of mass market digital communications, applications andcontent distribution, many access networks such as wireless networks,cable networks and DSL (Digital Subscriber Line) networks are pressedfor user capacity, with, for example, EVDO (Evolution-Data Optimized),HSPA (High Speed Packet Access), LTE (Long Term Evolution), WiMax(Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access), DOCSIS, DSL, andWi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity) becoming user capacity constrained. In thewireless case, although network capacity will increase with new highercapacity wireless radio access technologies, such as MIMO(Multiple-Input Multiple-Output), and with more frequency spectrum andcell splitting being deployed in the future, these capacity gains arelikely to be less than what is required to meet growing digitalnetworking demand.

Similarly, although wire line access networks, such as cable and DSL,can have higher average capacity per user compared to wireless, wireline user service consumption habits are trending toward very highbandwidth applications and content that can quickly consume theavailable capacity and degrade overall network service experience.Because some components of service provider costs go up with increasingbandwidth, this trend will also negatively impact service providerprofits.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Various embodiments of the invention are disclosed in the followingdetailed description and the accompanying drawings.

FIG. 1 illustrates a secure execution environment for device assistedservices in accordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 2 illustrates another secure execution environment for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 3 illustrates another secure execution environment for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 4 illustrates another secure execution environment for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 5 illustrates another secure execution environment for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 6 illustrates another secure execution environment for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 7 illustrates another secure execution environment for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 8 illustrates another secure execution environment for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 9 illustrates another secure execution environment for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 10 illustrates another secure execution environment for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 11 illustrates another secure execution environment for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The invention can be implemented in numerous ways, including as aprocess; an apparatus; a system; a composition of matter; a computerprogram product embodied on a computer readable storage medium; and/or aprocessor, such as a processor configured to execute instructions storedon and/or provided by a memory coupled to the processor. In thisspecification, these implementations, or any other form that theinvention may take, may be referred to as techniques. In general, theorder of the steps of disclosed processes may be altered within thescope of the invention. Unless stated otherwise, a component such as aprocessor or a memory described as being configured to perform a taskmay be implemented as a general component that is temporarily configuredto perform the task at a given time or a specific component that ismanufactured to perform the task. As used herein, the term ‘processor’refers to one or more devices, circuits, and/or processing coresconfigured to process data, such as computer program instructions.

A detailed description of one or more embodiments of the invention isprovided below along with accompanying figures that illustrate theprinciples of the invention. The invention is described in connectionwith such embodiments, but the invention is not limited to anyembodiment. The scope of the invention is limited only by the claims andthe invention encompasses numerous alternatives, modifications andequivalents. Numerous specific details are set forth in the followingdescription in order to provide a thorough understanding of theinvention. These details are provided for the purpose of example and theinvention may be practiced according to the claims without some or allof these specific details. For the purpose of clarity, technicalmaterial that is known in the technical fields related to the inventionhas not been described in detail so that the invention is notunnecessarily obscured.

In some embodiments, security techniques for device assisted servicesare provided. In some embodiments, secure service measurement and/orcontrol execution partition techniques for device assisted services areprovided. In some embodiments, a secure execution environment for deviceassisted services is provided. In some embodiments, a secure stack fordevice assisted services is provided. In some embodiments, a securememory for device assisted services is provided. In some embodiments, asecure modem for device assisted services is provided (e.g., providing asecure communication link between the modem/modem driver and a serviceprocessor and/or agent on the device, such as a communications device oran intermediate networking device). In some embodiments, one or moresecure monitoring points for device assisted services are provided. Insome embodiments, one or more secure monitoring points with verificationfor device assisted services are provided (e.g., a secured monitoringpoint can be provided in a modem, which communicates securely to asecured execution environment in a CPU/processor, which can then verifysuch service usage measures). In some embodiments, a secure bus fordevice assisted services is provided. In some embodiments, a secureexecution environment in the CPU/processor for device assisted servicesis provided. In some embodiments, secure access to a secure executionenvironment(s) for device assisted services is provided (e.g., securingcommunication from a bottom of the stack, such as modem drivers, whichrequire credentials to access the bus as controlled by a serviceprocessor or secure agent on the device, and in which the traffic on thebus is encrypted). In some embodiments, various secure executionenvironments for device assisted services are provided using varioushardware partition techniques (e.g., secure memory, secure modems,secure memory partition(s) in the CPU/processor), as described herein.

In some embodiments, device assisted services (DAS) provide for one ormore of device based service usage measurements, service usage policyimplementation, service usage accounting, service usage control, and anyof the other functions described in various embodiments that assist,replace, and/or augment network based functions. For example, variousDAS embodiments perform one or more of the following: facilitate andcontrol activation to one or more access service networks; measureaccess and/or service usage on one or more access networks; controlaccess and/or service usage on one or more access networks; account fordifferent types of service usage on one or more access networks;implement quality of service (QOS) controls, collect and report QOStraffic demand, aggregate multiple device QOS demand reports to asses ameasure of overall network QOS demand, and/or facilitate QOS resourceallocation; and/or facilitate roaming between access networks. There aremany more functions and embodiments for DAS as described with respect tovarious embodiments.

In some embodiments, various program/functional elements that performthe functions to implement various DAS embodiments are referred toherein as DAS agents or device assisted service agents, or in someembodiments, more specific terms are used to be more descriptive inspecific examples. In some embodiments, device assisted service agentfunctions include service measurements and/or service measure recordingand/or service measure reporting (e.g., to the service controller, thedevice, the user, or other device agents) and/or service measuresynchronization (e.g., between device and network). In some embodiments,device assisted service agent functions include service usage controlsand/or service usage control policy settings. In some embodiments,service usage controls include one or more of network authorization,network authentication, network admission, access control, service usageactivity classification, allowing or disallowing one or more serviceusage activity and traffic shaping for one or more service usageactivity.

In some embodiments, device assisted service agent functions include oneor more of the following: reporting service usage to QOS controlelements in the network, receiving QOS assignment from the network,reporting QOS assignments to the network, and/or communicating with QOSservice reservation elements in the network. In some embodiments, deviceassisted service agent functions include one or more of implementing QOSservice controls on the device based on one or more of the followingcriteria: fair queuing of service usage activities, differentiated QOSbased on an assigned QOS hierarchy of service usage activities, serviceusage activity QOS assignments from the network for one or more serviceusage activities, service usage activity policy directives from thenetwork for one or more service usage activities.

In some embodiments, a service control link is used for communicationbetween the device assisted service agents and the service controller.In some embodiments, the service control link is a secure link (e.g., anencrypted communication link).

In some embodiments, the device assisted service agent functions includedevice assisted service system communication, measuring and/or recordingand/or reporting and/or synchronizing service measures, observingcommunicating information for service control integrity, communicatinginformation for service control policy instructions and/or settings, orupdating device assisted software and/or agent settings.

In some embodiments, device assisted service on the device includes thefollowing: service measurements, service controls, user interface andusage reporting, user policy options, accept policy instructions,protected execution partition provided to prevent hacking, malware,errors, and other security techniques. In some embodiments, deviceassisted service on the server includes one or more of the following:set policy, set configurations, install/update agents, check usageversus policy, check proper operation of agents, synchronize usage fromnetwork to device, and other verification techniques. For example, whenerrors in policy enforcement are detected, servers can perform actionsto either further observe, quarantine, or suspend the device.

In some embodiments, a control server/control service network elementreceives service measures from the device. In some embodiments, thecontrol server/control service network element receives service measuresfrom the network. In some embodiments, the control server/controlservice network element sets policies and manages service acrossmultiple networks (e.g., while one modem is shown in various figures,multiple modems can be employed for multiple networks with consistentservice usage measures, service controls, QOS controls, UI (UserInterface), user preferences, user usage reporting, and/or othersettings/controls across different networks).

In some embodiments, traffic type refers to one or more of thefollowing: best effort network traffic, real-time traffic (e.g., livevoice such as VOIP, live video, etc.), streaming traffic, multi-casttraffic, uni-cast traffic, point to point traffic, file types, trafficassociated with an application, real time traffic, traffic with anassigned priority, traffic without an assigned priority, and traffic fora certain network.

In some embodiments, service usage activity refers to a usage of serviceby a device. In some embodiments, service usage activity can be one ormore of connection to an access network, connection to certaindestinations, URLs or addresses on a network, connection to the networkby one or more applications, transmission of certain types of traffic, atype of transaction based service, a type of advertising based services,or a combination of one or more of the following: an application type, anetwork destination/address/URL, a traffic type, and a transaction type.

In some embodiments, protection of the device assisted serviceagents/functional elements to protect the functions that perform thedevice assisted functions is provided with a protected executionpartition on the CPU (Central Processor Unit), APU (Auxiliary ProcessorUnit), or another hardware based processor. For example, such hardwareprotected execution capabilities in the CPU, APU, or other processor canbe combined in some embodiments with either OS software functions orother native mode software functions to create secure program executionpartitions as described herein. In some embodiments, the term host isused to refer to the hardware and firmware and/or software system thatexecutes the device applications and networking stack. In someembodiments, some of the device assisted service agents/functions areimplemented in a modem execution partition environment.

FIG. 1 illustrates a secure execution environment 100 (e.g., for acommunications device) for device assisted services in accordance withsome embodiments. As shown in FIG. 1, the device execution environmentsinclude program/functional elements for a communications (e.g., acommunications device can be an intermediate networking device, such as3G/4G WWAN to WLAN bridges/routers/gateways, femto cells, DOCSIS modems,DSL modems, remote access/backup routers, and other intermediate networkdevices, or a mobile communications device, such as a mobile phone, aPDA, an eBook reader, a music device, an entertainment/gaming device, acomputer, laptop, a netbook, a tablet, a home networking system, and/orany other mobile communications device) device that utilizes the modemsubsystems #1 (125) through #N (127) to connect to one or more of theaccess networks #1 (136) through #N (138). In some embodiments, acommunications device includes multiple program execution partitions. Asshown in FIG. 1, four execution partitions are provided: an applicationexecution partition 102 in which, for example, application programsexecute, a kernel execution partition 112 in which, for example, thelower level drivers and basic low level OS programs execute, a protecteddevice assisted service (DAS) execution partition 114 (also referred toas protected DAS partition) in which, in some embodiments, some or allof the device assisted service agents and/or functions execute, and amodem execution partition 124 in which, for example, the modem programelements execute and, in some embodiments, some or all of the deviceassisted service agents and/or functions execute. In some embodiments,each of these execution partitions are optimized for different softwarefunctions, each providing programs with the basic physical memory, datamemory, CPU or APU or modem processor execution resources, high leveland/or low level OS, memory management, file storage, I/O deviceresources (e.g., user interface (UI), peripherals, etc.), networkcommunications stack, other device resources, and/or other resourcesthat are required or used for operation of the programs. The collectionof these hardware and software resources for the CPU or APU is sometimesreferred to herein with the term host.

As shown, FIG. 1 illustrates an application execution partition 102 anda kernel execution partition 112, which are shown as separate partitionswithin the device execution environments. For example, this separationis based on the manner in which “kernel programs” (e.g., drivers andnetwork stack, etc.) are commonly supported as compared to “applicationprograms” (e.g., browsers, word processors, user interfaces, etc.)within the context of several different popular operating systems (OS)(e.g., Windows, UNIX, Linux, MAC OS, certain mobile device OSs, certainembedded device OSs, etc.). In some embodiments, this functionalseparation is not required, and, in some embodiments, other functionalseparations are supported.

As shown in FIG. 1, protected device assisted service agents, such asthe protected DAS partition device assisted service agents 110, executein the protected DAS partition 114 while unprotected device assistedservice agents and/or OS networking stack elements and applications(e.g., applications 106A through 106C) execute outside of the securedevice assisted service execution partition 114, such as the applicationpartition device assisted service agents 104 and the OS networking stackand/or kernel partition device assisted service agents 108. For example,the protected DAS partition 114 can make it more difficult for a hacker,malware or system errors to compromise, attack or modify the deviceassisted service measurements, service policy implementation or serviceusage control operations on the device (e.g., communications device). Insome embodiments, the protected DAS partition 114 need not support openaccess to all programs and OS elements so that it can be easier toprotect. Also, as shown, a bus driver 116 in the application executionpartition 102 provides for communication with a modem bus 120, which isin communication with a bus driver 121 in the modem execution partition124. The protected DAS partition also includes a host service controllink 118, which facilitates communication with a host secure channel 150as shown.

In some embodiments, the protected DAS partition 114 is a protectedexecution partition on the main device that is supported by certainconfigurations in the host (e.g., a secure virtual execution environmentor a separate hardware security function). For example, this protectedexecution partition can be used to provide added service measurementintegrity and/or service control integrity for a device assisted serviceenabled device. In some embodiments, as described herein, the operatingsystem (OS) also performs a role in establishing the protected executionpartition for secure operation of device assisted services, and, in someembodiments, this role is performed by native software or firmwareoperating on secure hardware elements.

In some embodiments, the DAS agents responsible for maintaining servicecontrol integrity execute in the protected DAS partition 114. Forexample, the protected DAS partition device assisted service agents 110can include one or more of the following: one or more service usagemeasurement functions; some or all of the device networking stackfunctions that are monitored and/or controlled by the device assistedservices system; device drivers that interface to an OS networking stackto observe or manipulate stack traffic; access control integrityfunctions; service policy control functions; service UI functions;application identification functions, and/or functions to classifyservice usage activities by combinations of application, address/URLand/or traffic type; modem bus driver functions; and/or modem dataencryption functions to prevent other unauthorized programs frombypassing the device assisted service measurements and/or controls bydirectly accessing the modem around the stack. In some embodiments, thesystem designer or a given set of design criteria determine which of thevarious described device assisted agent functions should be executed inprotected DAS partition 114 to strengthen the service control integrityfor the system.

In some embodiments, the device operating system provides for theprotected DAS partition 114 in addition to conventional securityfeatures available in the operating system. In some embodiments, theprotected DAS partition 114 provides an execution partition withincreased program execution protection in which, for example, servicemeasurement and/or service control programs (agents) can execute in amode that provides for higher access control integrity (e.g., properservice usage reporting and/or service measurement and/or servicecontrol system operation with increased protection from attacks, errors,malware, etc.). In some embodiments, a hardware assisted secureexecution partition provides for increased program execution protectionfor device assisted service agent functions.

In some embodiments, a service control link (e.g., host service controllink 118 via host secure channel 150 to network service control link152) is used for communication between the device assisted serviceagents and a service controller 122. In some embodiments, the servicecontrol link is a secure link (e.g., an encrypted communications link).In some embodiments, an encrypted secure control link can be implementedover the higher layers of the network stack (e.g., TCP, HTTP, TLS,etc.), and, in some embodiments, the encrypted link can be implementedover lower layers in the network stack, such as the IP layer or theaccess network layers (e.g., the WWAN device management channels orsignaling layers). In some embodiments, service control link security isprovided at least in part by encrypting link traffic between the deviceand the service controller 122. In some embodiments, service controllink security is provided at least in part by running the servicecontrol link device side program agents in the protected DAS partition114. In some embodiments, service control link security is achieved atleast in part by restricting access to the service control link tocertain device assisted service agents that are allowed to communicatewith the service controller 122. In some embodiments, the agents thatare allowed to communicate with the service control link perform suchcommunications using encrypted communications. In some embodiments, theencrypted communications is accomplished with a secure inter-agentcommunication bus on the device. In some embodiments, the only mechanismfor modifying the configuration of the operation, execution code,execution instructions and/or settings of certain device assistedservice processor agents executing in the protected DAS partition 114 isthrough the service control link. In some embodiments, the onlymechanism for modifying any program elements executing inside theprotected DAS partition 114 is through the service control link so thatonly the service controller 122 may modify the operation or servicepolicy settings for the agents located in the service measurement and/orservice control execution partition.

As shown in FIG. 1, various server functions within the servicecontroller 122 are provided. In some embodiments, a service historyserver 158 collects service usage measures from one or more of thedevice DAS agents and/or from various sources of potential network basedservice usage databases, such as the access network service usage 142(e.g., carrier charging data record (CDR) systems), private networkservice usage 144 (e.g., MVNO or enterprise network service usageaccounting system), and/or billing, mediation service usage log,reconciliation 148 (e.g., service provider billing or mediation system).In some embodiments, an access control integrity server 156 is used tocompare various access control verification checks to ensure that thedevice assisted service agents have not been compromised. The variousembodiments used in the access control integrity server 156 to performthese integrity checks are described with respect to variousembodiments. Some embodiments include comparing device based serviceusage measures versus the service usage that should result if thedesired service policy were properly implemented, comparing device basedservice usage measures versus the service usage that should result ifthe desired service policy were properly implemented with device basedservice usage measures that are executing in the protected DAS partition114 and/or the modem execution partition 124, comparing network basedservice usage measures versus the service usage that should result ifthe desired service policy were properly implemented, and comparingnetwork based service usage measures with device based service usagemeasures. In some embodiments, a policy control server 154 stores policysettings for the various service plans that can be implemented on thedevice, and communicates the appropriate policy settings to theappropriate device DAS agents.

In some embodiments, the service controller 122 has secure access toservice measures, service control settings, software images, softwaresecurity state(s), and/or other settings/functions, for example, byvirtue of the hardware enhanced execution partition and the securechannel into the protected DAS partition 114. For example, the hostsecure channel 150 can be encrypted employing keys that arepublic/private or point to point private. Also, other link security, forexample, can be implemented as described herein. For example, serverscan ensure that the link remains authenticated and information isvalidated. For example, the service controller can perform one or moreof the following verification techniques: compare the monitored serviceusage versus the policy, compare the monitored service usage versusother service usage measures and/or combined with various other networkservice usage measures.

In some embodiments, the protected DAS partition 114 includes a hostservice control link 118 as shown in FIG. 1 that works in combination,that is, in communication with a network service control link 152 tosend and receive secure messages between the service controller and thehost via a host secure channel 150. In some embodiments, the protectedDAS partition 114 only accepts new program images from the servicecontroller 122 and not from local programs or disks. In someembodiments, the protected DAS partition 114 cannot communicate withother applications and/or kernel programs. In some embodiments, theprotected DAS partition 114 can also communicate with other applicationsand/or kernel programs but only to gather information or to setsettings. In some embodiments, the protected DAS partition 114 can alsocommunicate with other applications and/or kernel programs but onlythrough a restricted encrypted communication bus that restricts outsideprogram access to protected programs or agent functions, and can alsorestrict the agents inside of the protected partition from acceptingunauthorized information or code modifications from programs outside theprotected partition. Various other security techniques can be providedfor the DAS execution environments as will be apparent to one ofordinary skill in the art in view of the embodiments described herein.

In some embodiments, the protected DAS partition 114 is created byemploying CPU or APU hardware security features in addition to or inalternative to other software security features (e.g., virtual executionpartitions) that can be provided by the operating system and/or othersoftware. In some embodiments, the host hardware security features areprovided with the operating system secure kernel operating modes. Insome embodiments, the host hardware security features used for securedevice assisted service execution partition operation are independent ofthe operating system kernel (e.g., implemented in secure programpartitions in a separate secure program area not directly controlled bythe OS and/or software that does not have access to the partitions).

In some embodiments, the hardware security features that support theprotected DAS partition 114 include preventing other elements on thedevice from writing and/or reading certain memory areas reserved fordevice assisted service agents and/or control link functions. In someembodiments, this memory protection function is accomplished by locatingthe memory in a secure hardware partition that cannot be accessed byunauthorized device program elements (e.g., a separate bank of isolatedmemory space within the host CPU). In some embodiments, this memoryprotection function includes encrypting traffic to and from memory sothat only authorized device program elements posses the counterpartencryption capability to access the memory. In some embodiments, themechanism to access device assisted service agent memory and/or certaindata elements is restricted to authorized device assisted service agentsand/or the service controller via the service control link so thatunauthorized program elements on the device cannot alter the deviceassisted service agent code and/or operation.

In some embodiments, the hardware security features that support theprotected DAS partition 114 includes preventing unauthorized elements onthe device from accessing the protected storage and/or file storage(e.g., “protected storage,” such as disk storage, non-volatile memory,embedded non-volatile memory, such as NVRAM, flash or NVROM, securelyembedded non-volatile memory, and/or other types of storage) that isused to store the device assisted service agent programs. In someembodiments, this protected storage is maintained within the securehardware partitions that also execute one or more of the device assistedservice agents so that only authorized device assisted service agentshave access to the storage locations. In some embodiments, the imagesthat are stored in such protected file storage must be properlyencrypted and signed for a boot loader to authorize loading the deviceassisted service agent programs into execution memory, and in someembodiments, if the images are not properly signed then an accesscontrol integrity error is generated and/or the program is not loaded.In some embodiments, such properly signed DAS images can only beobtained from the service controller. In some embodiments, such DASimages can only be loaded into protected file storage by the servicecontroller. In some embodiments, the hardware security features thatprevent unauthorized elements on the device from accessing the protectedfile storage include encrypting all traffic to and from the securestorage so that only authorized device program elements possess thecounterpart encryption capability to access the storage. In someembodiments, access or access rights to re-program a device assistedservice agent program store is restricted to the service controller viathe service control link so that unauthorized program elements on thedevice are not authorized to alter the device assisted service agentcode and/or operation.

In some embodiments, the hardware security features that protect deviceassisted service agent storage include a protected DAS partition inwhich an access control integrity agent function is isolated from otherdevice program elements, and a secure service control link is alsoisolated in a similar manner, and the access control integrity agentscans the execution memory, data memory and/or file storage used by oneor more device assisted services agents to measure and/or controlservices. In some embodiments, the purpose of the scan is to detectchanges to the device assisted service agent code and/or data. In someembodiments, the purpose of the scan is to detect other unauthorizedprogram elements or data that may be present in reserved or protectedareas used for device assisted service agent execution. In someembodiments, reports of such scan audits are reported over the servicecontrol link to the service controller for further processing by use ofcloud based resources to identify access control integrity violations.In some embodiments, the access control integrity agent functionsinclude one or more of hashing other device assisted security agents,querying other device assisted security agents, observing the operationof other device assisted security agents or monitoring service measuresand then either evaluating the results locally on the device todetermine if they are within pre-defined allowable parameters or sendingat least some of the results to the service controller for furtheranalysis via the service control link. In some embodiments, the scanaudits are compared with earlier versions of the scans to compare codeconfiguration or operational characteristics. In some embodiments, thescan audits are compared against known databases for the code oroperational characteristics that should be present in the DAS agents.

In some embodiments, an access control integrity agent, or a new versionof the access control integrity agent can be downloaded by the servicecontroller over the secure service control link. For example, thistechnique provides for a real time assessment of device service controlsecurity state as described above in the event that corruption orcompromise of the secure device assisted service agent(s) has occurred.In some embodiments, the access control integrity agent that isdownloaded can have a different configuration and/or operation than anyagent previously loaded onto the device so that it is difficult orimpossible for a hacker or malware to spoof the operation of the agentin a short period of time. For example, by requiring the agent to reportsecurity assessments back to the server in a period of time that istypically less than what is required to spoof the agent, the agent willeither report back an accurate assessment of device status or will beblocked by a hacker or malware, and both of these conditions can providethe information required to take action if the device assisted servicessystem has been corrupted or compromised.

In some embodiments, the protected DAS partition and/or the modemexecution partition can be used to securely store some or all of thedevice credentials that are used for one or more of device groupassociation, activation, authorization to the access network and/or theDAS network, service level, and service usage accounting and/or billing.

In some embodiments, the modem subsystem also includes DAS elements thatstrengthen the access control integrity of the DAS system. As shown inFIG. 1, one or more modems can include, in some embodiments, DAS agentfunctions labeled modem partition DAS agents 126. The modem executionpartition 124 of the modem sub system #1 (125) of the modem executionpartition 124 includes modem partition DAS agents 126 in communication(e.g., secure communication, such as using encrypted communications)with a modem 128 and a modem service control link 130, which is incommunication with the network service control link 152 via the modemsecure channel #1 (132), as shown. Also, the modem 128 is incommunication (e.g., secure communication, such as using encryptedcommunications) with the access network #1 (136), which is incommunication with the access network service usage 142 and the Internet140, which is in communication with a private network 146, which is incommunication with the private network service usage 144, as shown.

Example embodiments for DAS agent functions that execute in the modemexecution partition include modem encryption and modem service usagemeasures. In other embodiments, the modem execution partition can alsoinclude higher level DAS agent functions, such as stack trafficclassification, stack manipulation, access control, and/or trafficcontrol. For example, the modem execution partition can also include afull service processor that is fully capable of managing all aspects ofservice usage measurement and/or service control. It will now beapparent to one of ordinary skill in the art that the modem executionpartition can employ a number of the service security embodimentsdescribed in the context of the protected DAS partition, for example, toenhance the service integrity of the DAS system. For example, the DASagents on the modem can be stored in an encrypted and signed format onnon-volatile (NV) memory on the modem that is only accessible by thenetwork service control link or by a local secure control link from theprotected DAS partition to the modem execution partition. As shown inFIG. 1, a separate secure modem control channel (e.g., modem securechannel #1 (132) through modem secure channel #N (134)) that is distinctfrom the host secure control channel 150 is provided. This separatemodem control channel can either be implemented over the higher networklayers of the device or over the lower access network layer so thatspecial access to access network resources is required to even connectto the modem DAS agents 126 thereby further enhancing service controlrelated security.

In some embodiments, the protected DAS partition provides for performingthe DAS agent functions required for parental controls, enterprise WWANmanagement controls or roaming controls, and/or usage reporting in theprotected execution space. In view of the DAS embodiments describedherein, it will now be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art howto implement such protected controls for these various and otherapplication scenarios.

In some embodiments, a protected DAS partition provides for performing avirtual machine (VM) on top of a secure machine. The device applicationOS that is accessible by software that can be installed without specialpermissions can be isolated from the secure hardware and/or OS that isrunning under the VM. Using these techniques, malware can be “cocoonedin” on the VM OS rather than “walled out” as discussed with respect tovarious embodiments described herein.

In some embodiments, communication between program/functional elementsoutside of the protected DAS partition to DAS agents inside theprotected DAS partition is controlled by a secure encrypted channel. Insome embodiments, only programs/functions that have access tocommunicate with DAS agents are allowed to do so, and, in someembodiments, even these outside programs are not allowed to modify theDAS agent configuration, only to report information and/or receiveinformation.

For example, various embodiments can be used to connect to multipleaccess networks through multiple modems, with each modem potentiallybeing associated with a different set of DAS service policiescorresponding to the different types of access networks supported. Insome embodiments, such as for 3G/4G modems, WWAN/WLAN modems, andvarious other multiple modem embodiments, the multiple modems can alsobe provided on the same multi-mode modem subsystem rather than ondifferent modem subsystems.

In some embodiments, the various techniques and embodiments describedherein can be readily applied to intermediate networking devices as willnow be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art. For example, anintermediate networking device can includes some or all of the DASagents for managing, controlling, and/or measuring service usage for oneor more devices in communication with a wireless network via theintermediate networking device, in which the DAS agents can be executedin secure execution environments or secure execution partitions usingthe various techniques described herein. In some embodiments,intermediate networking devices include, for example, WWAN/WLAN bridges,routers and gateways, cell phones with WWAN/WLAN or WWAN/Bluetooth,WWAN/LAN or WWAN/WPAN capabilities, femto cells, back up cards for wiredaccess routers, and other forms/types of intermediate networkingdevices.

FIG. 2 illustrates another secure execution environment 200 for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments. In particular,FIG. 2 illustrates an embodiment in which DAS agents do not actuallyreplace the OS network stack elements, but instead one or more DASagents include device driver programs that interface into the networkstack and pass (e.g., securely communicate) traffic information oractual traffic back and forth with the stack. These device driverinterface constructs are labeled OS driver framework and interface 208as shown in FIG. 2. Example OS system constructs that provide for thistype of architecture for DAS agents include Windows NDIS and/or TDIdrivers, Windows Filter Platform (WFP), Berkeley Packet Filter, ipfw(e.g., a BSD packet filter that can be used for various OSs, such asUnix, Linux, MAC OS), and/or other platforms/programs performing theseor similar functions. While these OS stack options are not secure inthemselves, if the drivers that interface with them are secured asillustrated in FIG. 2 by executing the drivers in the protected DASpartition 214, then higher overall access control integrity/securitylevels can be achieved.

As shown in FIG. 2, the service measurement and/or policy controldrivers 210 executed in the protected DAS partition 214 represent theDAS drivers that interface to the OS stack device driver interfaceconstructs labeled OS driver framework and interface 208 executed in thekernel execution partition 212, which are in communicationwith/interface with OS Stack API(s) 207. As also shown, applications,such as applications 106A through 106C execute in the applicationexecution partition 202. In some embodiments, service access controlintegrity is further enhanced by placing additional measurement pointsoutside of the network stack, so that, for example, if the network stackservice usage reporting is hacked, corrupted, and/or compromised, thereis a secure additional or back-up service measure located on the deviceand/or in the network (e.g., modem agent 226 as shown in FIG. 2, whichprovides a service measurement point in the modem for measuring serviceusage by the device, and as shown also provides for secure communicationwith the modem agent 226 using modem encryption 225). For example, theservice measure provided by the modem agent 226, modem encryption 225,and/or modem bus 120 functions shown in FIG. 2 can be executed in aprotected partition (e.g., modem execution partition 124 as shown inFIG. 2 can be implemented as a secure or protected partition using thevarious techniques described herein).

FIG. 3 illustrates another secure execution environment 300 for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments. As shown, somestack elements are executed in the kernel execution partition 312 andsome stack elements are executed in the protected DAS executionpartition 314. In some embodiments, the DAS agents 104 executed in theapplication execution partition 302 are directly monitoring and/orcontrolling stack traffic by intercepting it and imposing additionaltraffic measurement and/or filtering. Examples of such techniques aredescribed herein with respect to various embodiments. As shown in FIG.3, the network stack elements 308 are the OS stack elements that residein the kernel execution partition 312 and the protected DAS networkstack elements 310 are the stack elements that reside in protected DASexecution partition 314. For example, as some or potentially all of thestack network traffic processing resides in the protected DAS executionpartition 314, a high level of service control integrity can bemaintained using these techniques. For example, the modem bus driver 121can be executed in a secure execution partition, such as modem executionpartition 324, which can be implemented as a secure execution partitionusing the various techniques described herein, or the modem bus driver121 can be executed in the protected DAS execution partition 314, sothat unauthorized programs can be blocked from accessing the accessnetwork through the modem.

In some embodiments, the entire stack is executed in the protected DASexecution partition 314 with only a stack API executing in kernelexecution partition 312. Various other embodiments involve implementinga minimum (e.g., in terms of a number of agents and/or functionality) inthe protected DAS execution partition 314 required to secure a servicemeasure that can be used to confirm the integrity of the service policyimplementation (e.g., as described with respect to various otherembodiments disclosed herein). As will now be apparent to one ofordinary skill in the art, various combinations of stack processingfunctions can be implemented in a secure host execution partition tostrengthen the service measurement and/or service control integrity ofthe DAS system using the techniques and/or similar techniques to thevarious techniques described herein.

In some embodiments, the stack elements implemented in the protected DASexecution partition can include stack API, sockets layer, TCP, UDP,service measurements at one or more points in the stack, IP layerprocessing, VPN/IPSEC, PPP, access control, traffic classification,traffic queuing, traffic routing, traffic QOS, traffic demand reportingto QOS allocation servers, traffic statistics reporting to the QOSservers, traffic QOS reservation requests including by traffic type orapp type or service priority to the servers, traffic throttling, trafficstatistics gathering, traffic QOS priority identification, modemdrivers, modem data encryption, and/or other stack element functionalityor features.

In some embodiments, the above discussed service control mechanisms arecontrolled by policy commands received over the service control linkfrom the servers or other authorized network elements. In someembodiments, the device also reports usage measures to servers or otherauthorized network elements. In some embodiments, the device alsoreports QOS demand to the servers or other authorized network elementsand/or accepts QOS instructions from the servers or other authorizednetwork elements. In some embodiments, the device reports trafficstatistics, projected traffic demand, application usage, projected QOSdemand can all be reported to the servers or other authorized networkelements for the purpose of provisioning the right amount of databandwidth and traffic priority to the device, and the servers or otherauthorized network elements aggregate such reports from many differentdevices to project needed allocations across the entire network and makeglobal bearer channel level or base station level decisions bearerchannel allocation and bearer channel QOS allocation decisions, whichcan also be tied into a bearer channel provisioning, or bearer channelQOS provisioning apparatus or other authorized network elements locatedin the access network.

For example, as will now be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the artin view of the various embodiments described herein, additional securitymeasures, can be added in some embodiments to augment the secure servicepartitioning, including, for example, access control integrity checks.For example, in addition to the service control policy instructions thatcan be received from the servers or other authorized network elements,an intermediate policy control agent can be present to make additionalhigher level decisions on how instantaneous policy should beimplemented.

As shown in FIG. 3, the modem control link, shown as modem local channel330, provides a link from local connection to the host service controllink 118, which in turn connects through the host secure channel 150 tothe service controller 152. This communication channel can also beimplemented or configured to provide for encrypted communication and, insome embodiments, can be used as an alternative to the direct connectionfrom the modem service control link to the network service control linkas disclosed with respect to other figures and various embodiments asdescribed herein.

As shown in FIG. 3, the final stack elements that feed or communicatewith the modem bus driver 121 are the protected DAS network stackelements 310 located in the protected DAS execution partition 314(illustrated as a solid line in FIG. 3), or, in some embodiments, can bethe network stack elements 308 located in the kernel execution partition312 (illustrated as a dashed line in FIG. 3). In some embodiments, thesefinal stack elements feed or communicate with the modem subsystem 125.In some embodiments, the modem subsystem 125 includes an encrypted linkso that the stack elements 310 in the protected DAS execution partition314 can communicate with the modem 128 but other software programs orhardware elements cannot, for example, thereby preventing the servicemeasures and/or controls from being inappropriately bypassed orotherwise comprised. For example and as similarly discussed above, themodem subsystem 125, for example, can include its own the protectedexecution partition using various techniques described herein. The modemprotected execution partition, for example, can also include a servicemeasure (e.g., modem agent 226 can provide such a service measurementpoint in the modem subsystem 125, as similarly described above withrespect to FIG. 2) to increase service control integrity verification asdepicted by service measure. The modem service measure can be includedin protected execution partition that can only be accessed by theservice controller 122 by way of the modem local channel 330, or themodem service measure can only be accessed by another DAS agent 310 inprotected execution partition 314. In some embodiments, the modem localchannel 330 is implemented as a secure channel (e.g., an encryptedcommunication channel between the modem service control link 130 and thehost service control link 118). As described herein, the modem drivercan reside in protected service execution environment, or the modemtraffic can be encrypted within service execution environment. Forexample, the encryption settings can be controlled by various securecontrol servers.

FIG. 4 illustrates another secure execution environment 400 for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments. In particular,FIG. 4 illustrates a direct stack manipulation option performed by theDAS agents executed in the protected DAS execution partition 414,including, as shown, an app(lication) identify agent 420, an accesscontrol integrity agent 422, a policy control agent 424, a policyimplementation agent 426, a service measure/service monitoring agent428, a modem encryption agent 430, and a bus driver 432. For example,the policy implementation agent 426 performs access control and/ortraffic shaping according a set of service control policies. The servicecontrol policies, for example, can be set by the service controller 122or by the service controller 122 in coordination with the policy controlagent 422. As shown the app identify agent 420 is in communication withthe various applications 106A through 106C executed in the applicationexecution partition 402. As also shown, the various applications 106Athrough 106C executed in the application execution partition 402 are incommunication with the OS stack and/or stack API(s) 408 executed in thekernel execution partition 412.

In some embodiments, the protected service measure agent 428, the modemencryption agent 430, the modem driver agent 432, the applicationidentifier agent 420, the access control integrity agent 422, and thepolicy control agent 424 are all implemented in protected DAS partition414, as shown. In some embodiments, as will now be apparent to one ofordinary skill in the art, a subset of these functions can beimplemented in a protected execution partition, such as the protectedDAS partition, in various circumstances.

FIG. 4 also similarly shows various embodiments that are available fornetwork based service usage measures and interfacing to the mediationand billing systems, and it should be understood that any or all of theembodiments and figures can be employed in the context of carriernetworks, MVNOs, private networks, or open networks supportingenterprise IT manger controls, parental controls, multi-networkcontrols, and/or roaming controls.

FIG. 5 illustrates another secure execution environment 500 for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments. In particular,FIG. 5 is similar to that FIG. 4 except that FIG. 5 illustrates a modemservice control link 132 that is connected directly to the servicecontroller 122 via the network service control link 152 (e.g., via amodem secure channel). In some embodiments, a modem control link for DASis established locally on the device or through an entirely differentcontrol channel, which, in some embodiments, provides enhanced securityas discussed herein (e.g., it is very difficult to hack a service usagemeasure or service control that cannot be accessed on the device).

FIG. 6 illustrates another secure execution environment 600 for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments. In particular,FIG. 6 illustrates a policy implementation agent 616 that includes theentire networking stack running in protected execution partition 614 andan OS stack API 608 that includes an application identifying function620 in the kernel execution partition 612.

FIG. 7 illustrates another secure execution environment 700 for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments. In particular,FIG. 7 illustrates DAS agents that do not replace the OS network stackelements, but instead one or more DAS agents are comprised of devicedriver programs that interface into the network stack and pass trafficinformation or actual traffic back and forth with the stack. Thesedevice driver interface constructs are labeled OS driver framework andinterface 722 in FIG. 7 as similarly shown in and described with respectto FIG. 2, along with OS stack API 708, which includes applicationidentifier function 720 as similarly discussed above with respect toFIG. 6, and are executed in kernel execution partition 712. Also, asshown, application partition DAS agents 104 are executed in applicationexecution partition 702. The main difference between the embodiment inFIG. 7 and that shown in and described with respect to FIG. 2 is thatthe service measure agent 428, modem encryption agent 430, and modemdriver agent 432 are executed in the protected DAS partition 714, asshown in FIG. 7. For example, this provides for enhanced service controlsecurity as described herein with respect to various embodiments.

FIG. 8 illustrates another secure execution environment 800 for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments. In particular,FIG. 8 illustrates a more simplified embodiment that is similar to thatof FIG. 7. In FIG. 8, only an access control integrity agent 422 and aservice measure 428 are executed in protected DAS partition 814, and thebus driver 432 and the service measurement and/or policy control drivers210 are executed in the kernel execution partition 712. This embodimentillustrates that provided that at least one protected service measure isprovided on the device, then the DAS service control integrity can bevery high. For example, if it is not possible to access the program codeor control traffic for the service measure agent 428, and the hostservice control link 118 except through the encrypted control channelfrom the service controller 122, then this simplified configuration canbe almost as secure as that possible with network based servicemeasures. It will now be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the artthat this technique similarly applies to a service measure and controllink similarly implemented in a protected modem execution partition 324.In some embodiments, the access control integrity agent 422 providesadditional security, for example, in the event that the protected DASpartition 814 is breached or compromised.

FIG. 9 illustrates another secure execution environment 900 for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments. In particular,FIG. 9 illustrates an embodiment similar to that of FIG. 8 except that,in particular, in addition to the service measure being executed inprotected DAS partition 914, the modem encryption agent 430 is alsoimplemented in/executed in the protected DAS partition 914. For example,this prevents unauthorized software from defeating the servicemeasurements and/or service controls by going around the network stackdirectly to the modem.

FIG. 10 illustrates another secure execution environment 1000 for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments. In particular,FIG. 10 illustrates an embodiment similar to that of FIG. 9 except that,in particular, there are additional app partition DAS agents 104executing in the application execution partition 702. For example, thisillustrates that some DAS agents can be implemented in application space(e.g., UI agent, policy control agent, and various other DAS agents asdescribed herein) while still maintaining a high level of servicemeasurement and/or control security as long as there are a few keymeasures and/or controls implemented in protected execution partitionsusing the various techniques described herein.

FIG. 11 illustrates another secure execution environment 1100 for deviceassisted services in accordance with some embodiments. In particular,FIG. 11 illustrates how the server cloud can be assisted by the on boardaccess control integrity agent to detect tampering with other servicemeasurement(s) and/or control agent(s), or to protect the servicemeasurement and/or control system from being attacked by malware and/orotherwise comprised. As shown, the access control integrity agent 422executes inside the protected DAS partition 1114 and is in communicationwith file storage 1130 (e.g., for persistently maintaining device statusand/or other settings or status or monitoring information). The accesscontrol integrity agent 422 performs the various access controlintegrity check functions as, for example, described herein with respectto various embodiments, and, in some embodiments, in coordination withthe servers over the secure control channel (e.g., host secure channel150). In some embodiments, the access control integrity agent 422 cansend the service controller 122 information about the other servicemeasurements and/or control agents so that the service controller 122can determine if the agents are working properly or have been tamperedwith or otherwise compromised. For example, such information can includesections of code, hashes, code segments, code variations from a previousimage, code variations from a historical image, responses to queries,checksums, observations of operating behavior or patterns, serviceusage, policy implementation behavior, and/or other information that maybe indicative of tampering, corruption, and/or a compromise of any ofthe device agents/measures. In some embodiments, the access controlintegrity agent 422 checks the operating environment for signs ofmalware signatures, or sends application and/or driver information orother information about the operating environments to the servers forfurther processing to detect malware. In some embodiments, the accesscontrol integrity agent 422 performs basic operations on protected DASpartition memory, kernel execution partition memory areas, applicationexecution partition memory areas, on disk storage areas or on other filestorage areas to detect known malware hashes or signatures, etc., or theaccess control integrity agent 422 can send the hashes to the serversfor comparison against malware databases (e.g., to compare againstsignatures for known malware or for further behavioral based or othersecurity/malware detection techniques).

In some embodiments, the DAS system is implemented in a manner that isrobust to losses in service control link (e.g., coverage outages on aWWAN link or loss of connection on a wired link). In some embodiments,the DAS system to be implemented in a manner that is robust to one ormore server elements in the service controller going offline or failingfor any reason. The following embodiments facilitate these techniques,as described below.

In some embodiments, it is advantageous for one or more of the deviceassisted service agents to maintain a record of the service usagereports and/or other reporting that is provided to the servicecontroller regarding device service control state (e.g., present serviceplan settings, current service usage policy settings, current userpreference settings, current DAS settings, current encrypted controlchannel and/or local encrypted communication channel key information,current DAS agent status reports, current DAS agent security statereports, current ambient service usage and/or transaction records,current service control integrity threat reports, user statusinformation, device status information, application status information,device location, device QOS state, and/or other state and/or settingsinformation). In addition to such information that exists on the deviceand is reported to the service controller, additional serviceinformation can be derived and recorded in the service controller, suchas information received from outside the device and/or analysis of thedevice reported information (e.g., network based service usage measures,analysis of device service usage, comparison of device reports withother information, analysis of access control integrity agent reports,information received from roaming networks, information input to theservice controller from parental control terminals, enterprise controlterminals, virtual service provider control terminals, access networkauthorization information, service integrity violation level, and manyother types of information used to properly measure and/or control thedevice services). For example, the information reported from the deviceand received or derived outside the device that is required toadequately define the actions needed from the service controller tomaintain proper DAS system operation is sometimes referred to herein asthe “device service state.”

In some embodiments, the service controller functions are highlyscalable and can be executed on a number of hardware and softwareplatforms (e.g., different virtual machines in a server, differentservers in a data center, or different servers located in different datacenters). For example, in such embodiments the service controller can bedesigned so that the programs that execute the various servicecontroller server functions can derive all of the information necessaryto properly manage the device at any moment in time by knowing pastdevice service state and current service state that adequately definethe next set of actions the service controller needs to implement toproperly maintain the DAS system operation. By designing the system inthis way, if the server that is running the service controller serverfunctions for any given device in question were to go down or becomedisconnected from the device, then another server could later resumeproper operation of the DAS system by assigning another servicecontroller server function to the device and recovering or restoring thenecessary past device service state and the necessary current deviceservice state.

For example, this can be accomplished in some embodiments as describedbelow. The service controller saves the current device service stateinto a common database (e.g., which can be centralized or distributed)that is available to all service controller server functions. The deviceservice state is saved each time the device communicates with theservice controller, or at regular time intervals, or a combination ofboth. The device retains its current and past service state reports evenafter they are reported at least until the service controller sends thedevice a message confirming that the service controller has saved agiven device service state. Once the device receives this saveconfirmation for a given device state report then it is no longerrequired to retain that particular device state report once the devicehas no further use for it. In this manner, if a service controllerserver function goes down then a save confirmation for one or morereported device states is not transmitted to the device by the servicecontroller, and the device can retain that report. A server loadbalancer detects that a given service controller server function hasgone down, looks up the devices that were being controlled by thatservice controller server function, finds that the device in questionwas one of those devices and re-assigns a new service controller serverfunction (either in the same data center or in another data center) tocontrol the device in question. The newly assigned service controllerserver function then recovers all past device states that were recordedin the service controller database and are required to properly managethe DAS system, and then asks the device to transmit or re-transmit alldevice state reports that were not saved in the service controllerdatabase. Once the device transmits or re-transmits the requestedinformation, the newly assigned service controller function then has theinformation it needs to properly manage the DAS system, it saves all thereported device state information, and then sends save confirmations tothe device so that the device need no longer retain the older servicestate reports. The newly assigned service controller server function canthen resume the DAS system operation with a set of actions that areidentical or very similar to the actions that would have been taken bythe original service controller server function if it had not gone down.One of ordinary skill in the art will now appreciate that the abovetechniques can also be used to accommodate temporary losses in theconnection between the device and the service controller. For example,such techniques provide for a highly scalable and robust approach toimplement a distributed service controller across multiple data centersfor reliable service redundancy. In some embodiments, the past deviceservice state information is saved in the protected DAS executionpartition and/or the modem execution partition, for example, so that itis protected from corruption.

Although the foregoing embodiments have been described in some detailfor purposes of clarity of understanding, the invention is not limitedto the details provided. There are many alternative ways of implementingthe invention. The disclosed embodiments are illustrative and notrestrictive.

INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE

This application incorporates the following provisional andnonprovisional U.S. patent applications by reference: application Ser.No. 12/694,445, filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled SECURITY TECHNIQUES FORDEVICE ASSISTED SERVICES; application Ser. No. 12/380,780, filed Mar. 2,2009, entitled AUTOMATED DEVICE PROVISIONING AND ACTIVATION; applicationSer. No. 61/206,354, filed Jan. 28, 2009, entitled SERVICES POLICYCOMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND METHOD; provisional Application No. 61/206,944,filed Feb. 4, 2009, entitled SERVICES POLICY COMMUNICATION SYSTEM ANDMETHOD; provisional Application No. 61/207,393, filed Feb. 10, 2009,entitled SERVICES POLICY COMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND METHOD; provisionalApplication No. 61/207,739, filed Feb. 13, 2009, entitled SERVICESPOLICY COMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND METHOD; and provisional Application No.61/252,151, filed on Oct. 15, 2009, entitled SECURITY TECHNIQUES FORDEVICE ASSISTED SERVICES.

What is claimed is:
 1. (canceled)
 2. A method of operating a wirelessend-user device, the method comprising: connecting from a secure modemsubsystem to a wireless cellular network; connecting a first securecontrol channel from the secure modem subsystem through the wirelesscellular network to a network service controller; connecting a secondsecure control channel from a secure execution environment, separatelysecure from the secure modem subsystem, through the secure modemsubsystem and the wireless cellular network to the network servicecontroller; receiving at the secure execution environment via the secondcontrol channel one or more messages from the network servicecontroller, the one or more messages comprising one or more servicepolicy settings; storing the one or more service policy settings in asecure memory partition accessible only from the secure executionenvironment; and enforcing, at least in part from the secure executionenvironment, a network service profile comprising the one or moreservice policy settings, to control the wireless end-user device use ofa service on the wireless cellular network.
 3. The method of claim 2,wherein the network service profile is associated with a service planthat provides for access to the service on the wireless network
 4. Themethod of claim 2, wherein the secure modem subsystem comprises a modemcontrol link and a modem local channel, and the first secure controlchannel connects the modem control link to the network servicecontroller through the modem local channel, and wherein the secureexecution environment comprises a host service control link, the secondsecure control channel coupled to the host service control link, themodem local channel providing secure communication between the modemcontrol link and the host service control link.
 5. The method of claim2, wherein the secure modem subsystem further comprises a modem agentaccessible only by the network service controller through the firstcontrol channel.
 6. The method of claim 5, wherein the modem agentcomprises a service measurement point for use of the service.
 7. Themethod of claim 6, further comprising the modem agent communicating areport of the use of the service to the network service controllerthrough the first control channel.
 8. The method of claim 7, furthercomprising the secure execution environment separately communicating areport of the monitored use of the service through the second controlchannel.
 9. The method of claim 2, wherein the one or more servicepolicy settings include an access control setting, a traffic controlsetting, and/or an admission control setting.
 10. The method of claim 2,wherein the one or more service policy settings include a network ordevice management communication setting.
 11. The method of claim 2,wherein the secure execution environment is implemented at least in partas a hardware partition.
 12. The method of claim 2, wherein the secureexecution environment is implemented at least in part as a softwarepartition.
 13. The method of claim 2, wherein the secure executionenvironment is implemented at least in part in a virtual machineexecuted on a processor.